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840 The American Political Science Review Vol. 77 
philosophically oriented reader will find Hardin 
well versed in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
thought that he draws on frequently to illustrate 
the earlier understanding of specific theoretical 
situations and their likely results. Some formal 
theorists may be disappointed that Hardin does 
not develop his arguments more rigorously. How- 
ever the breadth of insight and richness of em- 
pirically testable predictions more than compen- 
sate for the more general and less rigorous form 
of argument. There is much grist here, and it can 
be further efined by formal theorists, empirical 
researchers, and those seeking a general under- 
standing of the eternal puzzles and paradoxes fac- 
ing all humankind. 
ELINOR OSTROM 
Indiana University 
Federalism and Federation. By Preston King, 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1982. Pp. 159. $18.95, cloth; $6.50, paper.) 
More than a decade ago William Riker subtitled 
a review essay "Does Federalism Exist and Does 
It Matter?" (Comparative Politics, October 1969, 
pp. 135-146). His answer was largely negative, 
concluding that federalism is a "legal fiction," 
and he admonished political scientists "to study 
the real forces in a political system." In spite of 
this advice, political scientists continue to study 
federalism (including Riker), and so it is appropri- 
ate that Preston King has seen fit to address once 
again the complex issues surrounding this 
concept. 
King divides his "analytical theory" for federal 
union into discussion of federalism as political 
ideology and federation as a particular institu- 
tional relationship. As ideology, federalism has 
been favored by those who seek "diversity in 
unity" (p. 20 in political regimes. However, as 
King clearly shows, this notion is so ambiguous as 
to encompass a wide variety of specific and 
contradictory political programs. He analyzes 
three varieties of federalist ideology: as an argu- 
ment for centralization i The Federalist; as an 
argument for decentralization i  the diverse 
theories of Prodhoun, Calhoun, Bakunin, and 
Kropotkin; and as a means of political power 
balance. Federalism's use on behalf of such 
divergent purposes makes it useless as a label for a 
coherent ideology. 
King's attempt o establish "a defensible con- 
vention relating to the nature of federation" (p. 
14) is the more interesting and innovative part of 
this book. Before useful empirical work can be 
done to see if federation matters, improvement 
must be made to existing approaches for dis- 
tinguishing federations from confederations. 
Those who define federations in terms of a con- 
tract between territorial regions and a central 
government imply more of a degree of equality 
and volunteerism in the relationship than actually 
exists in practice, as shown dramatically by the 
American Civil War. King also finds wanting the 
more common method of distinguishing federa- 
tion in terms of degree of decentralization or local 
autonomy. Since all central governments provide 
at least some autonomy to local units ("the whole 
idea of a 'unitary' state would appear something 
of a myth," p. 126), some unambiguous, objec- 
tive criteria are needed for distinguishing how 
much and what kinds of decentralization result in 
federation. King does not think that such criteria 
exist or can be provided, and, in practice, "there 
is no observed degree of centralization/ decentrali- 
zation which commonly and distinctly marks off 
federations from so-called unitary states or em- 
pires" (p. 126). Therefore, he has no use for the 
conventional textbook distinction between federal 
and unitary states that obscures real empirical dif- 
ferences uch as the fact that "federal USA in. . . 
1970 was far more centralized . . . than was the 
'unitary' British Empire in . . . 1920" (p. 139). 
Although some might be persuaded by this 
analysis to discard federation as a useful scientific 
concept, King proposes instead a new definition. 
Federations are to be distinguished "solely by the 
fact that its central government incorporates 
regional units into its decision procedure on some 
constitutionally entrenched basis" (p. 77). Critical 
to the notion is the requirement hat "regional 
representation at the centre cannot be easily 
altered, as by resort to the bare majoritarian pro- 
cedure which serves normal purposes. . ." (p. 
143). Accordingly, the United States is a federa- 
tion because of equal state representation in the 
Senate, which cannot be altered without resort to 
the constitutional amendment procedure. King in- 
tends this definition to be of "a constitutional 
kind . . . whether these arrangements are writ- 
ten on paper or firmly imprinted on men's minds" 
(p. 145), but he is careful not to leapfrog into any 
empirical conclusions. 
Thus, King has embraced enthusiastically the 
legal fictions that define federations as the best 
approach for finding out if they matter. Most 
readers should be persuaded that King's approach 
is likely to permit a more objective classification 
than the other approaches he discusses. (Although 
many will object that, for some hard cases, deter- 
mining what constitutes "constitutionally en- 
trenched" representation is difficult, as in the 
French cumul des mandats. King could help his 
case by a more complete list of examples.) How- 
ever, many readers, unlike King, will also find 
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reinforcement i  his analysis for an intuitive judg- 
ment hat federation may not matter. 
WILLIAM E. HUDSON 
Providence College 
The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic 
Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. By 
Mancur Olson. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Uni- 
versity Press, 1982. Pp. xi + 273. $14.95.) 
In one of the most publicized and quickly 
reviewed books in modern social science, Mancur 
Olson has again tackled a momentous problem 
with his accustomed energy, imagination, and 
some originality. 
Although Olson begins his inquiry into the rise 
and decline of nations with a detailed summary of 
his earlier volume The Logic of Collective Action 
(Harvard University Press, 1971), perceptive 
readers may note that the current book is rooted 
not so much in the general thesis of The Logic, 
i.e., the free-rider theorem, as it is in a footnote 
on page 124 dealing with the efficiency and equity 
of pressure group activity. 
It does not follow that the results of pressure 
group activity would be harmless, much less 
desirable, even if the balance of power 
equilibrium resulting from the multiplicity of 
pressure groups kept any one pressure group 
from getting out of line. Even if such a pressure 
group system worked with perfect fairness to 
every group, it would still tend to work in- 
efficiently.... Coherent, rational policies can- 
not be expected from a series of separate ad hoc 
concessions to diverse interest groups. 
Much of The Rise and Decline of Nations con- 
sists of a theoretical rgument elaborating the 
footnote and supported by a vast array of diverse 
national data showing how those interests hat are 
organized will evolve into a system that at once 
decreases the efficiency of the private conomy 
and shifts the concerns of politics toward dis- 
tributional issues. The nine implications devel- 
oped in chapter 3are conveniently summarized on 
page 74. Olson's argument is essentially correct, 
but it is also incomplete. He focuses his attention 
on the conflict between efficiency and equity and 
resolves the conflict by showing how both suffer 
from a highly rigidified protectionist interest 
group economy. What Olson has not done is to 
show how the polity itself has created these prob- 
lems, and why it is in the self-interests of the 
government to engage in ad hoc concessions to 
those interests. Olson is strangely silent on this 
phenomenon of particular importance in public 
choice and rent-seeking. Olson makes but one 
brief reference to the latter and startlingly few 
references tothe former, a field in which he is a 
major contributor. Yet Olson's thesis is most 
compatible with the work of his colleagues from 
Blacksburg and, now, Fairfax, Virginia. It is also 
consistent with those political theorists including 
E. P. Herring, William Riker, and John Ferejohn 
who have shown the conditions for the inefficien- 
cy of logrolling among& politicians and interest 
groups. One simply cannot grasp the current 
economic difficulties ofthe Western democracies 
without a theory of public choice, and Olson does 
not supply one. There are few politicians, 
bureaus, and bureaucrats inThe Rise and Decline 
of Nations. 
Olson's vivid descriptions, extensive data, and 
interpretations of the social and economic diffi- 
culties are persuasive and eloquent. He has a 
remarkable talent for combining sobriety of 
thought with formal but graceful prose. His 
reasonableness, gentle logic, and desire to com- 
municate with the educated layman are manifest 
on every page but the last chapter on inflation, in 
which the analysis is on another, higher level. 
Nevertheless, not only does Olson take a long step 
toward Blacksburg (Fairfax) in his recognition of 
the perversity ofinterest groups, but also in his 
frank and repeated admonitions about the funda- 
mental importance of the microfoundations f in- 
flation and, indeed, all economic policy. 
Although the title of the book suggests that all 
nations might be considered, Olson confines him- 
self largely to the democracies where interest 
groups have long existed and had time to rigidify 
society. With considerable skill and originality he
shows how the devastation of World War II wiped 
the slate clean of interest groups in Germany and 
Japan so that the take-off into economic develop- 
ment could procede with the remarkable results 
we have all observed. Olson also applies his theory 
to American regional development and the new 
capitalist economies of Korea, Hong Kong, Singa- 
pore, and Taiwan. His book will surely spawn 
dozens of articles and doctoral dissertations. 
Political scientists are indebted to Olson for this 
stimulating and ambitious effort to write a theory 
of political economy. In his sometimes quaint and 
subtle manner, he has managed once more to ad- 
dress the big issues and make sense of them in 
nontechnical l nguage both respectable among his 
peers and accessible to noneconomists. His only 
remaining tasks are to incorporate into the frame- 
work a theory of public choice and to give some 
indication of how it might be possible to reform 
politics by using an inefficient redistributive 
politic. 
WILLIAM C. MITCHELL 
University ofOregon 
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